Files
secs-gem/interop
raphael 1da56f973f feat(daemon): alarms by name + RequestControlState + WatchHealth (Phase A complete)
A2 — alarms: optional 'name:' on alarm config (a LOCAL key — SEMI only
defines numeric ALID + freetext ALTX; field appended last so existing
{id, text, category} brace-inits compile unchanged), parsed by the loader,
checked by the validator, shipped in equipment.yaml. SetAlarm/ClearAlarm
RPCs resolve config name OR stringified ALID via a constructor snapshot.

A3 — control state + health: RequestControlState fires operator events on
the io thread (read_sync) and reports what the E30 table actually did —
ACCEPT iff the equipment landed in the requested state, CANNOT_DO_NOW naming
the actual state otherwise (the shipped table has no operator path to
EquipmentOffline; the test pins that honesty). ATTEMPT_ONLINE is rejected as
transient. WatchHealth streams an immediate snapshot then pushes on link/
control-state changes via service observers (add_link_observer +
add_control_state_observer — the HandlerSlot work paying off), spool depth
sampled at the 500ms poll; ends on cancel or engine stop.

Tests: daemon suite 61 -> 101 assertions (alarm lifecycle by name/id/unknown,
WatchHealth initial + change push, all four RequestControlState semantics);
loader test for the alarm name (present + absent fallback); core 467/3055.
Interop now 15 checks incl. gRPC SetAlarm -> host receives S5F1 ALCD=0x84
ALID=1, and RequestControlState(HOST_OFFLINE) -> GetControlState confirms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 19:47:31 +02:00
..

External cross-validation harnesses

Each harness in this directory validates the C++ codec, framing, and dispatch against an independent third-party implementation of the same SEMI standards.

See ../docs/VERIFICATION.md for the internal-vs-external breakdown across all validators.

What's here

Validator Independence Coverage
host_vs_cpp_server.py + passive_equipment.py secsgem-py 0.3.0 — Python reference impl 31 checks: S1, S2, S5, S6, S7, S10 happy paths + unsolicited S6F11 / S5F1
raw_gem300_harness.py secsgem-py with hand-crafted SecsStreamFunctions 3 checks: S3F17, S16F5, S16F27 (limited by SFDL grammar)
secs4j/Secs4jHostHarness.java secs4java8 — Apache 2.0 Java impl by kenta-shimizu 55 checks across S1/S2/S3/S5/S6/S7/S10/S14/S16, including the full E40 body that defeated secsgem-py and unsolicited S6F11/S5F1 observation
tshark_validate.sh Wireshark's built-in HSMS dissector 69 captured frames dissected with no malformed-packet warnings
spool_persistence_test.py secsgem-py + a docker-restart loop Restart-survives-spool integrity
⚙️ ../tests/test_e5_kat.cpp SEMI E5 §9 encoding rules 196 known-answer byte assertions across every format code
⚙️ ../apps/fuzz_secs2_decode.cpp + fuzz_sml_parse.cpp libFuzzer + ASan + UBSan ~70 000 + ~285 000 random inputs per minute, 0 crashes

The ⚙️ entries aren't in interop/ directly because they don't involve a network peer — they're either pure codec round-trips (KAT) or coverage-guided fuzzing. Listed here so the full external proof inventory lives in one place.

Running each validator

secsgem-py — secsgem-py active host → C++ server

docker compose up -d server
docker compose run --rm interop python3 /app/interop/host_vs_cpp_server.py \
    --host server --port 5000 --session-id 0

secsgem-py — C++ host → secsgem-py equipment

docker compose up -d equipment_py
docker compose run --rm builder /app/build/secs_interop_probe \
    --host equipment_py --port 5000 --device 0

secsgem-py — raw GEM 300 frames

docker compose up -d server
docker compose run --rm interop python3 /app/interop/raw_gem300_harness.py \
    --host server --port 5000 --session-id 0

secs4j — independent Java host → C++ server

bash interop/secs4j_validate.sh

Builds an eclipse-temurin:21-jdk sidecar with secs4java8 cloned + compiled at image build, then drives 55 checks against compose up server. See secs4j/Secs4jHostHarness.java for the list and secs4j/Dockerfile for the build.

tshark — Wireshark HSMS dissector

docker compose run --rm builder bash /app/interop/tshark_validate.sh

Captures a pcap of the demo flow, runs tshark -V with the HSMS dissector forced for the test port, asserts no malformed packets + that all expected control/data frames parse.

spool persistence — restart-survives test

bash interop/spool_persistence_test.py

Drops the host link mid-flight, kills the server, restarts it, and asserts the spooled S5F1 / S6F11 frames drain to the host on reconnect.

When to add a new validator

A new third-party SECS implementation, dissector, or fuzzer target that exercises the wire surface from an angle the existing five don't cover is worth adding. The pattern is consistent:

  1. New script / harness lives here (or a sidecar Docker context for non-Python validators).
  2. Wired into .gitea/workflows/ci.yml as a separate job.
  3. Listed in this README's table + in ../VERIFICATION.md.
  4. Surfaced in ../docs/PROOFS.md if it adds a meaningful new dimension.

Bug reports from a new validator → file at raphael@maenle.net with the wire trace, the validator's output, and the equipment YAML.