Interface cleanup so the report_* family matches the typo-safe ethos of eq.names instead of leaking raw protobuf errors on a misspelled value. - Milestone / ModuleState / JobState: importable str-enums (member == its wire name, so plain strings still work) — autocomplete + a typo-checked happy path. The clean rule: equipment-specific *names* live on eq.names; fixed protocol *value-sets* are enums. - _enum_value(): resolves an enum-or-string arg client-side and, on a bad value, raises ValueError with a close-match hint *before* the wire. Wired into report_job / report_substrate / report_module / request_control_state (all previously raised a raw protobuf ValueError). - Equipment is now a context manager (with Equipment(...) as eq: ...). - examples/wafer_tool.py: a cluster tool tracking one wafer through one module end-to-end (E90 + E157), showing the enums + context manager. - tests/test_enums.py: asserts the enums stay in lockstep with the proto and that the typo path is helpful. Wired into run_interop.sh (pyclient step). - Interop drives both the enum and string forms on the wire + the ValueError typo path. Docs (ch16/ch42) updated; names-vs-enums rule documented. All Python unit tests + 25 pyclient interop checks pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
External cross-validation harnesses
Each harness in this directory validates the C++ codec, framing, and dispatch against an independent third-party implementation of the same SEMI standards.
See ../docs/VERIFICATION.md for the
internal-vs-external breakdown across all validators.
What's here
| Validator | Independence | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
host_vs_cpp_server.py + passive_equipment.py |
secsgem-py 0.3.0 — Python reference impl | 31 checks: S1, S2, S5, S6, S7, S10 happy paths + unsolicited S6F11 / S5F1 |
raw_gem300_harness.py |
secsgem-py with hand-crafted SecsStreamFunctions | 3 checks: S3F17, S16F5, S16F27 (limited by SFDL grammar) |
secs4j/Secs4jHostHarness.java |
secs4java8 — Apache 2.0 Java impl by kenta-shimizu | 55 checks across S1/S2/S3/S5/S6/S7/S10/S14/S16, including the full E40 body that defeated secsgem-py and unsolicited S6F11/S5F1 observation |
tshark_validate.sh |
Wireshark's built-in HSMS dissector | 69 captured frames dissected with no malformed-packet warnings |
spool_persistence_test.py |
secsgem-py + a docker-restart loop | Restart-survives-spool integrity |
⚙️ ../tests/test_e5_kat.cpp |
SEMI E5 §9 encoding rules | 196 known-answer byte assertions across every format code |
⚙️ ../apps/fuzz_secs2_decode.cpp + fuzz_sml_parse.cpp |
libFuzzer + ASan + UBSan | ~70 000 + ~285 000 random inputs per minute, 0 crashes |
The ⚙️ entries aren't in interop/ directly because they don't
involve a network peer — they're either pure codec round-trips
(KAT) or coverage-guided fuzzing. Listed here so the full external
proof inventory lives in one place.
One command for everything
tools/run_interop.sh (from the repo root) runs every validation step —
build, both unit suites, all the harnesses below, tshark, and secs4java8 —
with a PASS/FAIL summary. SKIP_SECS4J=1 skips the Java image build.
Running each validator
secsgem-py — secsgem-py active host → C++ server
docker compose up -d server
docker compose run --rm interop python3 /app/interop/host_vs_cpp_server.py \
--host server --port 5000 --session-id 0
daemon bridge — gRPC tool + secsgem-py host → secs_gemd
docker compose up -d --no-deps gemd
docker compose run --rm --no-deps interop python3 daemon_interop.py \
--grpc gemd:50051 --hsms-host gemd
Both faces of the daemon at once: 20 checks proving gRPC SetVariables/ FireEvent/SetAlarm reach the reference host as S6F11/S5F1 over HSMS, and the HCACK-4 command loop (host S2F41 → tool stream → completion event).
Python client — published secsgem-client package → secs_gemd
docker compose up -d --no-deps gemd
docker compose run --rm --no-deps -e PYTHONPATH=/app/clients/python interop \
python3 pyclient_interop.py --grpc gemd:50051 --hsms-host gemd
13 checks driving the PUBLISHED Python API (eq.set / eq.fire / eq.alarm / @eq.on) against a live daemon, with secsgem-py judging the wire.
secsgem-py — C++ host → secsgem-py equipment
docker compose up -d equipment_py
docker compose run --rm builder /app/build/secs_interop_probe \
--host equipment_py --port 5000 --device 0
secsgem-py — raw GEM 300 frames
docker compose up -d server
docker compose run --rm interop python3 /app/interop/raw_gem300_harness.py \
--host server --port 5000 --session-id 0
secs4j — independent Java host → C++ server
bash interop/secs4j_validate.sh
Builds an eclipse-temurin:21-jdk sidecar with secs4java8 cloned +
compiled at image build, then drives 55 checks against
compose up server. See secs4j/Secs4jHostHarness.java for the
list and secs4j/Dockerfile for the build.
tshark — Wireshark HSMS dissector
docker compose run --rm builder bash /app/interop/tshark_validate.sh
Captures a pcap of the demo flow, runs tshark -V with the HSMS
dissector forced for the test port, asserts no malformed packets +
that all expected control/data frames parse.
spool persistence — restart-survives test
bash interop/spool_persistence_test.py
Drops the host link mid-flight, kills the server, restarts it, and asserts the spooled S5F1 / S6F11 frames drain to the host on reconnect.
When to add a new validator
A new third-party SECS implementation, dissector, or fuzzer target that exercises the wire surface from an angle the existing five don't cover is worth adding. The pattern is consistent:
- New script / harness lives here (or a sidecar Docker context for non-Python validators).
- Wired into
.gitea/workflows/ci.ymlas a separate job. - Listed in this README's table + in
../VERIFICATION.md. - Surfaced in
../docs/PROOFS.mdif it adds a meaningful new dimension.
Bug reports from a new validator → file at raphael@maenle.net
with the wire trace, the validator's output, and the equipment YAML.