The codebase has supported HSMS-GS since the original landing
(test_hsms_gs.cpp covers the wire-level Select.req-per-session
walk-list, the per-session Reject(EntityNotSelected) behaviour,
and session-routed data dispatch). But the documentation said
exactly one line about it ("Connection::add_session(device_id)
registers extra sessions on one TCP socket") and there was no
end-to-end test using the Server/Client API customers actually
build against.
INTEGRATION.md §7 is a new section showing the realistic pattern:
- Server-side: register the primary session via Server::Config,
then `add_session` for the second MES in the on_connection
callback. Per-session message handler + selected handler so
each MES gets its own router (or its own per-session data view
over a shared EquipmentDataModel).
- Active-mode: same `add_session` on the host-side Connection
for multi-tool fleet controllers.
- Equipment-initiated push: pick the session_id when sending
unsolicited primaries (S5F1, S6F11, S10F1).
- Pointer to the wire tests + the new integration test for
customers who want to see the failure modes.
tests/test_hsms_gs_integration.cpp drives two MES sessions
(device_id 1 + 2) through the Server/Client API end to end:
- Both sessions complete Select.req independently
- S1F1 sent on each session returns a distinct MDLN
("EQUIP-SESS-1" vs "EQUIP-SESS-2"), proving per-session
dispatch routes correctly
- Per-session router fires exactly once per session, no
cross-talk
Pre-existing §§8-10 in INTEGRATION.md got bumped to §§9-11 to
make room.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
secs-gem
A C++20 SECS-II / HSMS / SECS-I / GEM / GEM 300 runtime, fully containerized, with every behavioural rule encoded as YAML data (control state, equipment data dictionary, E40 process-job state machine, E94 control-job state machine, SECS-II message shapes).
Implements all of E5, E30, E37 (SS + GS), E4 SECS-I, E40, E42, E84, E87, E90, E94, E116, E120, E148, E157, E39. Per-store persistence on every mutable in-memory entity (spool, carriers, load-ports, substrates, process-jobs, control-jobs, exceptions). See COMPLIANCE.md for the per-capability audit, INTEGRATION.md for the vendor-side tutorial, BENCHMARKS.md for the performance envelope, and MES_INTEROP.md for the day-1 punch list to run against your commercial MES.
License: proprietary — see LICENSE. No use, copy, compile, evaluate, benchmark, or deploy without a written license from the copyright holder. Contact
raphael@maenle.netfor commercial licensing, evaluation terms, or fab deployment.
Quick start
Everything runs in Docker — no compiler or build tools on the host.
docker compose run --rm builder # configure + compile
docker compose run --rm tests # 384 cases / 2390 assertions
docker compose up --no-deps server client # live two-container demo
Architecture
The project is "spec-as-data": the SEMI behavioural rules live in YAML; the C++ is the engine that reads them.
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ data/ │
│ messages.yaml SECS-II message catalog │
│ control_state.yaml E30 §6.2 control transition table │
│ process_job_state.yaml E40 §6 PJ transition table │
│ control_job_state.yaml E94 §6 CJ transition table │
│ equipment.yaml SVIDs / DVIDs / ECIDs / CEIDs / │
│ alarms / recipes / commands │
└──────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┘
│ (loaded at startup, codegen at build)
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ tools/gen_messages.py │
│ reads messages.yaml -> emits generated/secsgem/gem/messages.hpp
└──────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ apps/ │
│ secs_server.cpp passive equipment │
│ secs_client.cpp active host │
│ (both use gem::Router for dispatch) │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
secsgem::config loader.hpp: YAML -> tables + data model
secsgem::gem every per-standard FSM (E30, E40, E84, E87,
E90, E94, E116, E120, E148, E157, E39, E5
exceptions), each per-store-persistable.
EquipmentDataModel composes all stores.
Router (stream, function) -> handler.
Generated messages.hpp covers 164 SxFy.
secsgem::hsms Connection (Asio): HSMS-SS + HSMS-GS, all
T-timers enforced, auto S9F3/F5/F7/F9/F11.
secsgem::secsi SECS-I Protocol FSM (E4): T1/T2/T3/T4 enforced
in-FSM, TCP transport for tunnel testing.
secsgem::secs2 Item (variant), encode/decode, Message,
SML parser/printer.
Tree
secs-gem/
├── Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml # toolchain + demo
├── CMakeLists.txt
├── README.md
├── COMPLIANCE.md # per-capability audit
├── INTEGRATION.md # vendor integration tutorial
├── data/
│ ├── messages.yaml # SECS-II message catalog (164 msgs)
│ ├── control_state.yaml # E30 control state transitions
│ ├── process_job_state.yaml # E40 PJ transitions
│ ├── control_job_state.yaml # E94 CJ transitions
│ └── equipment.yaml # equipment data dictionary
├── tools/
│ └── gen_messages.py # codegen (messages.yaml -> .hpp)
├── include/secsgem/
│ ├── secs2/{item,codec,sml,message}.hpp
│ ├── hsms/{header,connection}.hpp
│ ├── secsi/{header,block,protocol,tcp_transport}.hpp
│ ├── gem/ # FSMs per SEMI standard
│ ├── gem/store/ # one file per focused store
│ ├── config/loader.hpp
│ └── endpoint.hpp
├── src/{secs2,hsms,secsi,gem,config}/*.cpp
├── apps/
│ ├── secs_server.cpp # passive equipment demo
│ ├── secs_client.cpp # active host demo
│ └── secs_interop_probe.cpp # cross-test against secsgem-py
├── interop/ # secsgem-py 0.3.0 cross-validation
└── tests/test_*.cpp # 384 cases / 2390 assertions
Adding a capability
The point of "spec-as-data" is that adding behaviour almost never requires a C++ change.
New SVID
# data/equipment.yaml
svids:
- {id: 4, name: ChamberTemp, units: "C", type: U4, value: 25}
New host command with side effects
host_commands:
- {name: VENT, ack: Accept, emit_ceid: 400, set_alarm: 2}
New state transition
# data/control_state.yaml
transitions:
- {from: OnlineRemote, on: host_request_offline, to: EquipmentOffline, ack: Accept}
New SECS-II message
# data/messages.yaml
- id: S6F30
stream: 6
function: 30
w: true
builder: s6f30_something
parser: parse_s6f30
body:
kind: list
struct_name: Something
fields:
- {name: field_a, shape: {kind: scalar, item_type: U4}}
- {name: field_b, shape: {kind: scalar, item_type: ASCII}}
docker compose run --rm builder regenerates messages.hpp. The typed
builder, parser, and struct definition appear automatically.
Production / fab deployment
The library is a runtime stack. Shipping it on a real tool involves more than building the binary. This section enumerates the work that sits between "tests pass" and "this is running on the fab floor."
1. Persistence directory layout
Enable persistence per store at startup, before the connection comes up. Pattern (the call sites are equivalent on every store):
auto base = std::filesystem::path("/var/lib/acme-secsgem");
model->spool.enable_persistence(base / "spool");
model->carriers.enable_persistence(base / "carriers");
model->load_ports.enable_persistence(base / "loadports");
model->substrates.enable_persistence(base / "substrates");
model->process_jobs.enable_persistence(base / "pjobs");
model->control_jobs.enable_persistence(base / "cjobs");
model->exceptions.enable_persistence(base / "exceptions");
Storage rules:
- Mount this volume on the same physical disk as the binary — network filesystems (NFS) can introduce latency that interferes with the rename-based atomic write pattern.
- Back this volume up daily. Journal files are small (a few hundred bytes each) and rsync-friendly.
- Set sane retention. Cleared exceptions and dequeued PJs are removed automatically; complete carriers / substrates / CJs are the application's responsibility to sweep. Cap by file count (a million files in one directory is fine on ext4 / xfs; less on others).
- Disk space: budget 100 MB for a busy fab tool over a year (~500 K transitions, ~200 bytes each). In practice it's far less because terminal-state records are removed.
After a crash, the next process start replays every store and is back to the prior in-memory state before the HSMS port opens.
2. Security
HSMS over plain TCP is the spec's wire protocol. The library ships unencrypted by design — that's what equipment manufacturers expect. In a real fab:
- Network isolation: HSMS must run on a control LAN, never
exposed to engineering / corporate networks. Default the
--portto 5000 / 5005 on a dedicated VLAN behind firewall ACLs that whitelist your MES host's IP. - TLS tunnel: for cross-site HSMS (rare but real for multi-fab shared hosts), tunnel the TCP through stunnel or a sidecar proxy. Don't modify the HSMS wire protocol; wrap the socket.
- Authentication: HSMS doesn't include peer auth. Rely on network-layer mTLS (sidecar proxy) and per-tool firewall rules.
- Audit logging: enable
Connection::set_log_handlerand ship to a SIEM. Every SECS-II message in/out should be retrievable for a configurable retention window — many fabs require 90 days. - YAML config integrity: sign your config bundles
(
equipment.yaml,control_state.yaml, etc.) and verify the signature on load. Misconfiguration is one of the top root-causes of GEM-related fab incidents.
3. Monitoring and observability
The library exposes hooks at every layer. Wire them to whatever your fab already runs.
| Signal | Hook | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| HSMS connection lifecycle | Connection::set_log_handler, set_selected_handler, set_closed_handler |
reconnect storms, unexpected separates |
| T3 / T6 / T7 / T8 timer fires | set_closed_handler reason starts with "T*" |
host MES unreachable, fab network event |
| Auto S9F* emission | set_log_handler line containing "-> S9F" |
malformed peer traffic, schema drift |
| Spool depth | model->spool.size() |
host MES backpressure / outage |
| FSM transitions (every store) | set_*_change_handler |
tool state, throughput, anomaly detection |
| Persistence directory size | du -s var/lib/acme-secsgem |
journal growth, untracked terminal-state records |
Recommended metrics export pattern: aggregate into Prometheus via a sidecar that polls the data model. Per-CEID emission rates, alarm set/clear rates, T-timer expiry counts, and spool depth form a reasonable starter dashboard.
Hooks fire on the io_context thread. Every set_*_change_handler
callback the library invokes runs on the connection's io_context
(there are no locks anywhere in EquipmentDataModel). Metrics
exporters and log shippers wired into those callbacks must either be
thread-safe themselves or hand the work off (a lock-free queue, a
separate exporter thread polling published counters, asio::post
onto another executor). Doing blocking I/O from inside a handler
stalls the dispatcher — keep handlers cheap. See INTEGRATION.md §3
for the cross-thread update pattern.
4. High availability
The library is single-threaded per HSMS connection — that's how HSMS works. For HA:
- Run two equipment processes in active/standby on the same tool, sharing the persistence volume. Only the active accepts the HSMS port; the standby tails the journal. Failover is filesystem-locked.
- Reconnect on the host side: an MES-side disconnect should
trigger T5-based reconnect. Configure
Timers::t5to your MES's policy (default 10s). - Graceful shutdown: SIGTERM should flush the write queue,
call
conn->separate(), and exit cleanly so the journal is point-consistent. The providedapps/secs_server.cppshows the pattern.
5. Deployment patterns
Three common shapes:
Docker / podman on a tool PC
FROM ubuntu:24.04
COPY build/secs_server /usr/local/bin/
COPY etc/ /etc/acme-secsgem/
VOLUME /var/lib/acme-secsgem
EXPOSE 5000
ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/secs_server", \
"--port", "5000", \
"--config", "/etc/acme-secsgem/equipment.yaml", \
"--state-table", "/etc/acme-secsgem/control_state.yaml", \
"--spool-dir", "/var/lib/acme-secsgem/spool"]
systemd unit
[Unit]
Description=ACME SECS/GEM equipment
After=network.target
[Service]
Type=simple
User=secsgem
Group=secsgem
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/secs_server --port 5000 \
--config /etc/acme-secsgem/equipment.yaml \
--state-table /etc/acme-secsgem/control_state.yaml \
--spool-dir /var/lib/acme-secsgem/spool
Restart=always
RestartSec=5
LimitNOFILE=8192
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
Kubernetes (multi-tool cell controller)
Run one Pod per tool with the persistence volume mounted from local-storage (not NFS). The Service exposes the HSMS port on the control LAN. Use a PodDisruptionBudget to ensure the standby is available during rolling updates.
6. Upgrade path
YAML edits don't require a rebuild — restart the process and the new dictionary loads. Code changes do require rebuild + restart.
- Zero-downtime for YAML: if you're using the active/standby HA pattern, edit YAML on the standby, restart the standby, promote.
- Code upgrades: deploy to a canary tool first; bake-test for at least a full wafer batch before fleet-wide rollout.
- Schema migrations: persistence records carry a 1-byte version
stamp after the magic byte. Every store (
ProcessJobStore,SubstrateStore,ControlJobStore,CarrierStore,LoadPortStore,ExceptionStore,SpoolStore) accepts any version in[1, kVersion]: code at kVersion=2 loads both v1 and v2 records (v1 trailer fields default to empty). Future versions beyondkVersionare rejected so a downgrade can't silently corrupt data. Upgrade discipline: when adding fields, bumpkVersionand gate the new trailer behindif (version >= N)in the loader. Tests intests/test_persistence_upgrade.cpplock down the contract and act as a tripwire if a writer bumpskVersionwithout teaching the loader to handle prior versions. Always test the upgrade with a real on-disk journal before fleet rollout.
7. Integration with the fab stack
| Other system | How this library talks to it |
|---|---|
| MES (Camstar, Mozaic, Camstar) | HSMS-SS over TCP (secs_server listens on a port the MES is configured to connect to) |
| Multi-MES (HSMS-GS) | Connection::add_session(device_id) registers extra sessions on one TCP socket |
| AMHS / OHT | E84 per-port FSMs (E84PortStore::on_signal_change(port, signal, value)); wire to your I/O bridge |
| Recipe engine | RecipeStore.add (opaque) + RecipeStore.add_formatted (E42 structured) |
| Alarm sources | AlarmRegistry::set(alid, active) from your sensor poll |
| Carrier scanner | CarrierStore::create / fire_id_event / set_slot_state |
| Wafer tracker | SubstrateStore::create / fire_*_event |
| EPT / shift report | EptStateMachine::accumulated(state) reads the time-bucket counters |
8. Compliance and certification
- Fork
COMPLIANCE.mdand prune it to your tool's claimed coverage; ship that copy with the tool. - Run the in-repo conformance harness against your tool:
Exits 0 with a per-check PASS / FAIL summary covering every E30 fundamental capability (establish comms, on-line ID, status data, equipment constants, clock, alarms, PP management, documentation). Adapt
build/secs_conformance --host <tool-ip> --port 5000 --device 0apps/secs_conformance.cppto add your tool's capability-specific checks. - Run an independent third-party validator (GEM RTS or equivalent) against your specific tool — a passing library + in-repo harness is necessary but not sufficient for certification.
- Capture wire traces from every validator run; archive for audit.
9. Testing in production
- Canary: deploy to one or two tools per fab before fleet rollout.
- Synthetic transactions: a heartbeat that issues S1F1 every 60s and alerts on T3 timeout. Catches MES-side outages before a real recipe does.
- Shadow traffic: for upgrades, run the new version listening on a second port; have MES dual-connect; diff the responses.
10. Operational runbook (starting point)
Common production incidents and the right response:
| Incident | First check | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| HSMS connection flapping | T7 / T6 timer fires in logs | check MES reachability, network MTU |
| Spool depth growing | host MES connectivity / ACK rate | force-drain via S6F23, escalate to MES |
| State machine "stuck" | last state-change handler log line | host-issued offline + re-establish |
| Alarm storm | AlarmRegistry all() snapshot |
check upstream sensor; quench via S5F3 |
| Persistence dir growing unbounded | du -s + file count |
sweep terminal-state records |
| Cross-tool inconsistency | secsgem_tests on canary tool |
compare wire trace vs validator |
Demo
The two-container demo walks ~24 SECS transactions end-to-end
through the data model. Run docker compose up --no-deps server client
and watch the logs interleave.
Build details
The toolchain image (Dockerfile) is Ubuntu 24.04 with g++-13, CMake,
Ninja, libasio-dev, libyaml-cpp-dev, and Python 3 for the codegen.
doctest is fetched via CMake FetchContent. Build artifacts live in a
named Docker volume so the host filesystem stays clean.
Standalone Asio is used in header-only mode (ASIO_STANDALONE). No
Boost dependency.
Interop
interop/ contains the secsgem-py 0.3.0 cross-validation harness —
secsgem-py active host driving our C++ passive server, our C++ active
host probing secsgem-py's passive equipment, and a raw GEM-300 harness
that round-trips S3 (E87), S14 (E94), S16 (E40), S12 (wafer maps)
through hand-crafted SecsStreamFunction subclasses. See
interop/README.md.