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raphael fc898f8410 feat: EquipmentRuntime engine owner + secs_gemd gRPC daemon

Extract the SECS/GEM engine wiring out of the secs_server app into a
reusable class, and stand up a language-agnostic gRPC daemon on top so a
tool's software (any language) can drive the equipment without linking C++
or knowing SEMI. Foundation for replacing a vendor's SECS/GEM server.

Engine reuse:
- EquipmentRuntime (include/secsgem/gem/runtime.hpp, src/gem/runtime.cpp):
  owns io_context, passive Server, model, control-state machine, Router;
  thread-safe outbound API (set_variable/emit_event/set_alarm/clear_alarm),
  on_command hook, deliver_or_spool, run()/run_async()/poll()/stop().
- register_default_handlers (src/gem/default_handlers.cpp): the 56 GEM
  handlers + domain emitters, relocated from secs_server so the app and the
  daemon speak byte-identical GEM. secs_server.cpp reduced ~1270 -> 113 lines.
- name_index.hpp: resolve_variable(name) -> VID (the name->id binding layer).

Daemon (apps/secs_gemd.cpp, proto/secsgem/v1/equipment.proto):
- runs the engine + HSMS link on a background thread; serves the gRPC
  Equipment service. Increment 1: SetVariables (name-resolved, plain
  value->Item) and GetControlState. proto carries the full v1 surface
  (universal + carrier/recipe/job tiers); remaining RPCs + the Subscribe
  command stream are next (docs/DAEMON_ROADMAP.md).
- CMake: opt-in SECSGEM_DAEMON, protoc/grpc_cpp_plugin codegen, gracefully
  skipped where protobuf/grpc++ are absent. Dockerfile gains the grpc deps.

Tests (proof): test_runtime, test_default_handlers (S1F1->S1F2, S2F41->hook),
test_name_index. Full suite 458/458, 2795 assertions; live server<->client
GEM300 demo still passes on the refactored server.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-10 18:01:16 +02:00

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Vendor Daemon & gRPC API — Status and Roadmap to Fab-Readiness

This is a forward-looking roadmap, not a description of shipped behaviour. Every item carries a status marker. Do not read an item as "done" unless it says ✅. (Written 2026-06-10.)

Status legend: ✅ done · 🚧 in progress · ⬜ planned · ⚠️ risk/unknown

What this is

A vendor-facing daemon that runs the SECS/GEM engine as its own process and exposes a small, name-based, language-agnostic API over gRPC, so a tool's control software (in any language) can drive the equipment without linking C++ or knowing SEMI. See proto/secsgem/v1/equipment.proto for the API.

The point of the daemon model: it owns the durable HSMS relationship with the host and stays conformant while the tool software restarts/upgrades/crashes.

Current status (2026-06-10)

Piece	Status	Notes
`proto/secsgem/v1/equipment.proto`	✅	v1 API surface designed (universal + carrier/recipe/job tiers)
`HostCommandRegistry::set_handler` behaviour hook	✅	the engine seam the daemon binds to; tested
`EquipmentRuntime` (engine owner)	✅	infra + outbound API built & tested (`tests/test_runtime.cpp`); `secs_server` now runs entirely on it (verified by the live server↔client GEM300 demo — full job/spool/control-state flow, client exit 0).
`register_default_handlers` in the library (so the daemon reuses the 56 handlers)	✅	relocated into `src/gem/default_handlers.cpp` (programmatic move, zero retype); `secs_server` reduced to ~113 lines and calls it. Tested (`tests/test_default_handlers.cpp`: S1F1→S1F2, S2F41→on_command hook) + live GEM300 demo still passes.
gRPC/protobuf in toolchain (Dockerfile + CMake)	🚧	apt deps added to Dockerfile (`libgrpc++-dev libprotobuf-dev protobuf-compiler-grpc`); image rebuild + CMake proto codegen still TODO.
`secs_gemd` daemon implementing the service	⬜	translate RPCs ↔ runtime; stream host requests
Reference client library (Python)	⬜	thin wrapper over generated stubs

Nothing in the proto is wired to the engine yet. The engine itself is broad (56 wire handlers across S1/2/3/5/6/7/10/14/16; all GEM300 stores) — the daemon is about exposing that, not building it.

Gaps to fab-readiness

Layer 0 — Make it run at all (blocks everything)

⬜ Extract EquipmentRuntime from apps/secs_server.cpp (io_context, Server, model, router, emit lambdas, set_handler). Reduce secs_server to a thin main() over it. Verify against the existing test suite.
⬜ Add gRPC/protobuf to the Dockerfile + CMake codegen for the proto.
⬜ Implement secs_gemd: construct the runtime, io.run() on a background thread, map each RPC to a runtime call, route host requests onto the Subscribe stream via set_handler + the FSM change handlers.
⬜ One reference client (Python) proving the end-to-end loop.

Layer 1 — API completeness (engine supports these; surface them)

⬜ Job/carrier in-the-loop semantics. The proto has ProcessJob/ CarrierAction + report RPCs, but the exact contract is unspecified: who acks the host's S16F5/S3Fxx, whether the tool gates a job start or only observes, and timing vs. T3. Design this before implementing the daemon for process tools.
⬜ Trace data collection (engine: TraceStore, S2F23/S6F1).
⬜ Limits monitoring (engine: LimitMonitorStore, S2F45).
⬜ Substrate/E90 + module/E157 tracking (engine: SubstrateStore, ModuleStore).
⬜ Terminal services / operator messages (engine: S10F1–F6) — host↔tool HMI text.
⬜ Spool depth + force-flush API (engine: SpoolStore).
⬜ Describe RPC: enumerate configured variables/events/alarms/commands at runtime (diagnostics & tooling).

Layer 2 — Production hardening

⬜ gRPC auth / exposure. No auth today. Bind to a Unix domain socket or localhost-only, or add credentials. Never expose the API on the equipment LAN unauthenticated.
⬜ Subscribe reconnect/replay semantics. Define what happens to host requests (commands, jobs) if the tool client disconnects and reconnects: are they buffered/replayed, or dropped? Required for a 24/7 tool. (Correctness gap.)
⬜ Supervised deployment (systemd unit / container), auto-restart; rely on the existing spool persistence so queued host events survive a daemon restart.
⬜ Expose the existing Prometheus metrics + structured logs from the daemon.
⬜ Decide multi-host (HSMS-GS) story — engine supports it; v1 assumes one equipment/session. Probably fine; document the assumption.

Layer 3 — Actual fab acceptance (the hard gate)

⚠️ Standards correctness is unverified. The SECS/GEM behaviour in this repo was substantially reconstructed without access to the SEMI standard texts. Interop tests (secsgem-py, secs4java8, Wireshark) mitigate but do not prove conformance. Subtle wire/state-machine deviations could fail a real host. This is the #1 fab-readiness risk and it is verification, not features.
⬜ Pass a specific fab's MES qualification suite against their real host (see docs/MES_INTEROP.md for the punch-list). Fab acceptance is empirical and per-fab.
⬜ Produce the GEM compliance statement (S1F19/F20) + written GEM manual matching the tool's actual data dictionary.
⬜ Finish the SECS-I serial driver (FSM done; asio serial_port adapter missing) — only if a target tool uses RS-232 rather than HSMS/TCP.
⬜ Per-tool equipment.yaml authored to match the tool's real SVIDs/CEIDs/ ECIDs/alarms/recipes and the fab's spec (vendor work; the config validator helps).

Sequencing recommendation

Layer 0 in order (runtime → deps → daemon → client), then Layer 1's job/carrier semantics, then Layer 2 hardening. Layer 3 runs in parallel and is gated by access to real standards and a real host — treat it as the thing that decides whether any of this is truly fab-ready.

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