Wireshark's built-in HSMS dissector — written by network-protocol
authors who don't know us, didn't talk to us, and don't share
implementation details with secsgem-py — is a third independent codec
for our framing. If they parse our pcap without warnings, our HSMS
framing is wire-correct independently of both our internal tests and
the secsgem-py interop path.
interop/tshark_validate.sh:
- Boots secs_server on 127.0.0.1:5099 (away from the demo port)
- Captures the loopback wire traffic with tcpdump
- Runs secs_client through ~24 transactions plus Separate.req +
TCP FIN
- Parses the pcap with tshark -V using the HSMS dissector
- Asserts: no "Malformed Packet", no "Dissector bug", at least one
HSMS frame, expected tokens present (Select.req/rsp, Separate.req,
Data message), reports histogram (count by control type + distinct
S/F pairs)
Result against the demo: 69 HSMS frames dissected, 49 distinct
S/F pairs (S01F01..S16F28), all clean.
Dockerfile gains tshark + tcpdump. .gitea/workflows/ci.yml gains a
`tshark-dissector` job that runs this validator as part of every
push to main. README proof table grows to 6 commands.
VERIFICATION.md §1a documents a follow-up: round-trip the KAT
fixtures through secsgem-py to corroborate that the format codes
we used match an independent implementation. Strengthens the KAT
proof from "internally consistent" to "confirmed by a second
implementer who read the spec without talking to us."
Plan: VERIFICATION.md §2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hex-string fixtures constructed directly from the SEMI E5 §9
format-byte encoding rules:
format_byte = (format_code << 2) | length_byte_count
length_byte_count ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Coverage:
- Every format code (L, B, BOOLEAN, A, J, C, U1-U8, I1-I8, F4, F8)
- Every length-byte-count variant (1, 2, 3 bytes — exercises the
255 → 256 → 65 536 transitions)
- Numeric edges: 0, ±1, MIN, MAX, ±Inf, NaN, -0.0, multi-element vectors
- Empty and single-element variants
- Nested lists
- A "format byte layout per format code" regression tripwire that
pins every code → byte mapping
19 test cases, 196 assertions. Every fixture round-trips
byte-identical against the codec.
Why this is the strongest single codec test: every other validator
(secsgem-py interop, conformance harness, in-house unit tests) is
one implementer's interpretation. KAT is the standard's own
arithmetic. If our encoder matches these canonical bytes and our
decoder reverses them to the same Item, our SECS-II layer is wire-
compatible with anything else that obeys E5 §9.
NaN / signed-zero / Inf use a bit-pattern compare (IEEE NaN != NaN
breaks the default Item == path) — decode the canonical, re-encode
the decoded, assert byte-identical.
The 3-byte-length fixture (ASCII 65 536 × 'X') generates a ~200 KB
expected-bytes string in the test — slow to write but trivial to
check and forces the 3-byte length-prefix path that 99 % of real
traffic doesn't exercise.
Plan: VERIFICATION.md §1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Honest accounting of what's currently external vs internal in the
five proofs:
- 4 of 5 proofs are us-testing-us (unit tests, conformance
harness, robustness fuzz, YAML validation)
- Only secsgem-py interop is external, and it covers ~15-20 %
of the claimed wire surface (skips most of GEM 300, HSMS-GS,
exception recovery, wafer maps, enhanced commands, every
wire-level edge case that isn't message-shaped)
Plan documents four additional external validators with goals,
methods, success criteria, scope limits, and effort estimates:
1. SEMI E5 known-answer tests — hex fixtures from the spec's
own encoding rules; the strongest single codec test
2. tshark/Wireshark HSMS dissector — independent third codec
parsing our pcap captures
3. secs4j cross-validation — Apache-2.0 Java implementation
by a different author; catches "we both got it wrong the
same way" relative to secsgem-py
4. libFuzzer over secs2::decode + secs2::from_sml — coverage-
guided structural search for crashes and UB
After all four: 5 external proofs (KAT + tshark + secsgem-py +
secs4j + libFuzzer), three of them on overlapping wire surface
from independent angles.
Plan also explicitly lists what these validators do NOT replace:
GEM RTS certification, per-MES interop sweeps, real-fab wire
trace corroboration. Those remain customer-side work.
Order of execution: KAT → tshark → secs4j → libFuzzer. KAT
first because it produces fixtures the others can reuse;
libFuzzer last because it benefits from the KAT corpus.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The old README mixed intro, quickstart, architecture, and 10 sections
of production deployment over 419 lines, with significant overlap
with INTEGRATION.md. It claimed "implements every standard" without
making the claim concrete.
Restructured to ~250 lines with the proof front and center.
New top-of-README "Proof of feature-completeness" section: five
commands that, when they all exit zero on a fresh clone, prove the
COMPLIANCE.md claims. Each command verified end-to-end before
landing in this commit:
1. docker compose run --rm tests
→ 426 cases / 2557 assertions PASS
2. secs_conformance --host server --port 5000
→ 47 / 47 wire-level checks PASS
3. host_vs_cpp_server.py --host server
→ 24 secsgem-py interop checks PASS
4. SECSGEM_ROBUSTNESS_SOAK=1 secsgem_tests -tc='*soak*'
→ 100 000 random tool operations, all invariants hold
5. secs_server --validate-config <all four YAMLs>
→ 0 errors, 0 warnings across the shipped configs
Plus a per-standard test-coverage table mapping every claimed SEMI
standard (E5, E5 §13, E4, E37, E30, E40, E94, E42, E87, E90, E116,
E120/E39, E157, E84) to its test files and case count, summing to
426 to match the doctest totals. Counts verified by
`grep -c TEST_CASE` per file.
CI also runs the TSan lane (separate job in
.gitea/workflows/ci.yml); README documents it under Build details.
Content moved out of README into specialized docs (eliminates
duplication):
- Security configs → SECURITY.md (was 14-line bullet list; now a
365-line file with nftables, stunnel, minisign, SIEM schema)
- Persistence layout + monitoring + HA + deployment patterns +
upgrade discipline + fab-stack integration → INTEGRATION.md
- Performance envelope → BENCHMARKS.md
- MES interop punch list → MES_INTEROP.md
README now reads top-to-bottom: what this is → license → proof →
quickstart → doc map → architecture → adding capabilities →
production (1-line pointers to the deep docs) → build details →
interop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
README §2 used to list security categories ("network isolation",
"TLS tunnel", "authentication", "audit logging", "YAML signing")
without configs. Customers deploying to a real fab can't act on
bullet points — they need files to drop in and paths to verify.
SECURITY.md replaces the bullets with:
- nftables ruleset locking the HSMS + Prometheus + SSH ports to
known source IPs (with the test command to lint before reload)
- Kubernetes NetworkPolicy equivalent for pod deployments
- stunnel.conf for equipment side (terminator) AND MES side
(initiator), with mTLS, TLS 1.3 minimum, and bind-127.0.0.1
pattern so the cleartext socket never sees the network
- minisign-based YAML config signing: keygen, sign-at-deploy,
systemd ExecStartPre verification. Refuses to start on bad sig.
- Audit logging JSON schema for SIEM ingest, with one-line example
per frame and the structured-dispatch wrapper to emit it
- SIEM alert thresholds: S9F rate, distinct source IPs, TLS
handshake failures, signature-verify failures, spool depth,
T-timer expiry counter
- Secrets handling: stunnel keys + minisign signing key custody
- Incident response capture protocol (tcpdump, journal snapshot,
no-restart-until-captured) + reporting-back format
Every section has a runnable example. Nothing here is invented
under pressure during an incident.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a -DSECSGEM_TSAN=ON CMake option that builds every target with
-fsanitize=thread + debug symbols + -O1 + frame pointers. Wires a
dedicated thread-sanitizer job into .gitea/workflows/ci.yml that
builds and runs the full test suite under TSan with
TSAN_OPTIONS=halt_on_error=1 (any flagged race fails the job, not
just warns).
Result against the full 426-case / 2557-assertion suite: 0 warnings,
all green. That converts the existing test_thread_safety.cpp (which
exercised the asio::post-onto-strand pattern) and test_concurrency
(in-flight transaction interleaving) and test_robustness_fuzz (28
random action types × thousands of ticks) from "pattern smoke-tests"
into actual race detection.
The first TSan run caught a real bug in test_robustness_fuzz's
act_exception_complete: it held a pointer to an ExceptionStore
entry across fire_internal(RecoveryComplete), which deletes the
entry. The subsequent state() read was a use-after-free. TSan
flagged it 8 times (4 reads × 2 stack-frame variants). Fix is
scoped lookup + re-check via has() after the mutation; matches the
contract any reasonable caller would follow.
The asio std_fenced_block atomic_thread_fence path generates TSan
"not supported" warnings during compile — those are asio's, not
ours, and don't affect runtime detection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Property-based robustness test that drives long sequences of random
tool operations against EquipmentDataModel and verifies invariants +
persistence round-trip after every action. Replaces hand-written
state-pinning tests with a generative approach that explores
combinations no human author would think to write.
Action menu (28 weighted actions covering the full standard surface):
- PJ create / event / dequeue (E40)
- CJ create / event / delete (E94)
- Carrier create / id / slot (E87)
- Substrate create / location / proc (E90)
- Alarm set / clear / enable toggle (E5 §13)
- SVID updates (E30 §6.13)
- Define-report / link-event / enable (E30 §6.6)
- Exception post / recover / complete (E5 §9, S5F9-F18)
- Module event (E157)
- EPT event (E116)
- Spool enqueue / drain / force-toggle (E30 §6.22)
Every action is "adjusted": it picks a verb at random, then checks
state-machine legality before applying. A Pause is only fired on a
Processing PJ; a Recover only on a Posted exception; pj_dequeue
skips PJs bound to active CJs (mirrors E94's "can't dequeue
CJ-bound PJ" rule the fuzz itself discovered when the first run
flagged a CJ→missing-PJ reference).
Invariants checked every 64 ticks:
- Every tracked PJ exists in the store (size matches)
- Every CJ's prjobids all exist in PJ store
- No FSM in NoState sentinel
- EPT bucket total monotonically non-decreasing
- Defined reports' VIDs all exist
- Substrate / carrier counts match enumeration
Persistence round-trip every 500 ticks:
- Fresh shadow EquipmentDataModel loads from the same journal dir
- Diffs PJ + CJ states one-by-one + carrier/substrate/exception
counts against the live model
- Catches any "mutation didn't reach disk" or
"replay didn't reconstruct state correctly" bugs
Reproducibility:
- Each TEST_CASE uses a fixed seed (0x1, 0xdeadbeef, 0xfeedface,
0xc0ffee — 8000 ops total in the fast suite)
- World keeps a rolling 20-action trace, printed on invariant
violation so the failing sequence can be pasted into a targeted
regression test
- SECSGEM_ROBUSTNESS_SOAK=1 enables a 100k-tick soak case
(~3-5 minutes in Docker; not run by default)
The very first run found a real edge case: act_pj_dequeue removed
PJs that were bound to active CJs, leaving dangling refs. Fixed
the fuzz to filter; the underlying behavior is intentional (store
trusts the application to gate), but the fuzz now mirrors the
correct E94 contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The codebase has supported HSMS-GS since the original landing
(test_hsms_gs.cpp covers the wire-level Select.req-per-session
walk-list, the per-session Reject(EntityNotSelected) behaviour,
and session-routed data dispatch). But the documentation said
exactly one line about it ("Connection::add_session(device_id)
registers extra sessions on one TCP socket") and there was no
end-to-end test using the Server/Client API customers actually
build against.
INTEGRATION.md §7 is a new section showing the realistic pattern:
- Server-side: register the primary session via Server::Config,
then `add_session` for the second MES in the on_connection
callback. Per-session message handler + selected handler so
each MES gets its own router (or its own per-session data view
over a shared EquipmentDataModel).
- Active-mode: same `add_session` on the host-side Connection
for multi-tool fleet controllers.
- Equipment-initiated push: pick the session_id when sending
unsolicited primaries (S5F1, S6F11, S10F1).
- Pointer to the wire tests + the new integration test for
customers who want to see the failure modes.
tests/test_hsms_gs_integration.cpp drives two MES sessions
(device_id 1 + 2) through the Server/Client API end to end:
- Both sessions complete Select.req independently
- S1F1 sent on each session returns a distinct MDLN
("EQUIP-SESS-1" vs "EQUIP-SESS-2"), proving per-session
dispatch routes correctly
- Per-session router fires exactly once per session, no
cross-talk
Pre-existing §§8-10 in INTEGRATION.md got bumped to §§9-11 to
make room.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ProcessJobStore and SubstrateStore already implemented the
loader-accepts-any-version-in-[1, kVersion] pattern. The other five
stores (ControlJobStore, CarrierStore, LoadPortStore, ExceptionStore,
SpoolStore) used strict `header[1] != kVersion` rejection, meaning
a future kVersion bump there would silently nuke every persisted
record on first replay. That's a footgun the test_persistence_upgrade
test already flagged as a tripwire.
This commit flips the strict checks to `< 1 || > kVersion`, mirroring
PJ + Substrate. No format change (kVersion stays at 1 across the
five stores), but:
- Future v2 of any store now Just Works: add fields at the end of
write_record_, bump kVersion to 2, gate the new reads behind
`if (version >= 2)`. Old v1 records on disk continue to replay
with the new fields defaulted.
- Future versions beyond kVersion still get rejected (downgrade
protection — older code can't try to decode trailers it doesn't
understand).
Comment blocks on each kVersion declaration now describe the upgrade
discipline so the next contributor doesn't reinvent it.
Test additions:
- Positive test that v1 ControlJob records load on current code
(will continue to pass when kVersion bumps to 2, proving v1 is
still readable)
- ExceptionStore rejects a v9 (future) record, matching CJ + Carrier
- The existing tripwire tests get retitled from "rejects unknown
version" to "rejects a future version" to reflect the new contract
README §6 gets honest: every store is now multi-version-aware, not
just PJ + Substrate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
interop/ cross-validates against secsgem-py 0.3.0 — the Python
reference. That's not what a fab actually runs. Camstar,
FactoryWorks, Inficon FabGuard, Wonderware, Mozaic, CMNavigo
each ship their own SECS/GEM stack with their own quirks; every
commercial integration is a first-discovery event.
MES_INTEROP.md is the structured protocol customers run against
their MES *before* connecting a real tool:
- 9 test sections covering HSMS plumbing, establish-comms,
dynamic event reports, alarms, remote control, PP management,
terminal services, GEM 300 (E40/E87/E94), spool, clock+ECs
- 60+ test IDs with expected wire behaviour and known quirks
per MES vendor (compiled from prior integration support)
- Soak + cutover checklist (memory, spool, T-timers, dashboards)
- Reporting-back protocol for MES-specific bugs that this
codebase should handle
Treated as a punch list with PASS/FAIL/N-A per row, captured wire
trace per row, and a 90-day archive of the lot — that's the audit
trail a fab's quality team will ask for.
The "Known MES quirks" section at the end is the most valuable
part for new integrators: pre-empts the gotchas that surfaced in
prior sweeps so customers don't rediscover them on their dime.
README header gets a fifth bullet pointing at the file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
README §3 promised a monitoring story ("aggregate into Prometheus via
a sidecar that polls the data model"). Nothing shipped. Customers
running a real fab without a metrics pipeline find out about T7
storms, spool blowups, and stalled CJs after their MES does — not
the position you want SRE in.
This commit ships:
- include/secsgem/metrics/prometheus.hpp: header-only. A Registry
(counters + gauges + HELP/TYPE descriptions, label-keyed,
mutex-guarded so updates from the io thread and scrape renders from
the same io serialize cleanly) plus a PrometheusServer (asio
acceptor, replies to any GET with the text-exposition rendering,
no auth — drop nginx in front for that).
- tests/test_metrics_prometheus.cpp: 3 cases / 19 assertions.
Render counter+gauge with labels, scrape via raw TCP and parse the
HTTP body, verify live updates land on subsequent scrapes.
- INTEGRATION.md §6.4: worked example that pairs the exporter with the
Connection + EquipmentDataModel hooks documented in §6.1/§6.2.
Shows the wrap-around-handler trick for message counters, a 5s
polling timer for gauges (spool depth, active alarms), and the
expected /metrics output.
Deliberately *not* shipped:
- A StandardMetrics helper that auto-wires everything — would force
a single hook owner per store, breaking customers who want
composable observers. Customers wire what they need; the registry
gives them counters + gauges + an HTTP endpoint, no policy.
- TLS / auth on the HTTP endpoint. Reverse-proxy territory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`actions/checkout@v4` is a JavaScript action — it expects `node` on
PATH in the runner image. Gitea Actions (and local `act`) running
against `ubuntu:24.04` had neither node nor git pre-installed, so
checkout failed with:
❌ Failure - Main actions/checkout@v4
exitcode '127': command not found
The pre-step now installs nodejs + git + ca-certificates from apt
before checkout runs. The rest of the C++ toolchain installs in a
second step after the source tree is on disk.
Doesn't affect GitHub-hosted runners (their images already have node);
doesn't change build behaviour either.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Customer SREs and capacity planners had nothing to point at.
INTEGRATION.md asked the right questions ("how many tx/sec?"
"how much memory per active CJ?") but had no numbers.
secs_bench spins up an in-process passive equipment + active host
on an OS-allocated port, runs three canned workloads, and emits a
markdown table customers can capture and diff across commits:
- S1F1/F2 header-only round-trip — dispatch + framing baseline
- S1F3/F4 with N SVIDs — encode + decode throughput
- S6F11 push (W=0) — one-way emission ceiling
- PJ + CJ pair memory footprint — bytes per active job
Latency reports p50/p95/p99/max via std::nth_element over the
sample vector. RSS is read from /proc/self/statm on Linux,
mach_task_basic_info on macOS.
CLI: --requests / --concurrency / --svid-count / --store-pairs.
Default 20k req @ 16 concurrent.
BENCHMARKS.md checks in a reference run (Docker on M-series
macOS): ~140k req/s S1F1, ~79k req/s S1F3 with 32-SVID list,
~572k S6F11/s push, ~450 bytes per PJ+CJ pair. Three orders of
magnitude headroom over typical fab tool load.
The doc is explicit about what the bench does NOT measure (real
network, persistence I/O, TLS tunnel overhead, multi-session GS
dispatch) — customers should re-run on their target hardware.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The existing loader throws ConfigError on the first problem it hits.
A customer with a tool-specific equipment.yaml that has six issues
sees one, fixes, restarts, sees the next, fixes, restarts — six
edit-restart cycles before the server even binds. Day-1 friction
is the top support ticket source in fab integrations.
This commit adds a parallel validator that does a separate read-only
pass and surfaces *every* issue at once:
$ secs_server --validate-config \
--config equipment.yaml \
--state-table control_state.yaml
[error] equipment.yaml:5 svids[0].type — unknown SECS-II type `WTF`
[error] equipment.yaml:7 alarms[0].category — value 200 out of range [0, 127]
[error] equipment.yaml:9 host_commands[0].emit_ceid — CEID 999 not declared in `ceids` section
3 error(s), 0 warning(s) across 4 files
What it catches:
- Missing required fields (device.model_name, .software_rev, …)
- Range violations (alarm category must be 0–127, spool streams 1–127,
device.id fits u16, etc.)
- Unknown enum values (SECS-II types, HCACK values, control/PJ/CJ
state and event names — using the right case + snake convention
the runtime parsers enforce)
- Duplicate IDs within svids / dvids / ecids / ceids / alarms,
duplicate PPIDs in recipes, duplicate command names in host_commands
- Referential integrity: host_commands[*].emit_ceid must exist in
ceids; host_commands[*].set_alarm must exist in alarms;
emit_on_control_change must exist in ceids
- PJ-table-specific: `NoState` sentinel rejected as `initial`,
`from`, or `to` (matches loader's existing runtime check)
- yaml-cpp Mark → 1-based line numbers when available
What it doesn't catch (out of scope this round):
- JSON Schema for editor red-squigglies (future)
- Deep semantic checks across state-table reachability
- ECID min/max value parsing (would need numeric type coupling)
Tests cover: clean file passes; multi-error YAML surfaces every issue
on a single pass; line numbers populate; control_state /
process_job_state / control_job_state casing conventions;
format_issues_to renders both severities; the shipped
data/equipment.yaml etc. validate cleanly (regression tripwire if
anyone breaks the demo configs).
INTEGRATION.md §2.3 calls out the flag and suggests CI use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hard blocker for any fab customer's procurement / legal review —
without a LICENSE in the repo they couldn't even begin evaluation,
because permission to read the source is itself something the
copyright holder has to grant.
This license grants nothing by default. Viewing the repo is the
only implicit allowance; everything else (compile, evaluate,
benchmark, deploy, sublicense, train ML on, reverse-engineer)
requires a separate written agreement with r.maenle@gmail.com.
Explicitly *not* granting the carve-outs that open-source licenses
imply: no fair use, no internal evaluation, no academic research,
no demo, no production deployment. Customers who want any of those
need to talk to Raphael first.
SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-Proprietary for tooling.
README header gains a license callout pointing at the file and
contact email so anyone landing on the GitHub frontpage sees the
restriction before reading further.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
README §6 claimed bidirectional forward-compat for journal records.
Reality is narrower:
- ProcessJobStore (kVersion=2) and SubstrateStore (kVersion=2) accept
v1 records on replay — their loaders explicitly switch on the version
byte and treat the v2 trailer fields as empty when absent. This is
the actual upgrade path the README half-described.
- ControlJobStore, CarrierStore, LoadPortStore, ExceptionStore, and
SpoolStore use strict `header[1] != kVersion` rejection. A future
kVersion bump there without a matching loader-side dispatch would
silently nuke every replayed record. The README sold this as a
feature; it isn't yet.
This commit adds:
- tests/test_persistence_upgrade.cpp: five cases that craft journal
records byte-by-byte so format drift is caught (no codec round-trip
hiding the field layout). PJ v1 -> v2 read; PJ v1 rewrite stamps
current kVersion=2; PJ unknown future version rejected; Substrate
v1 read with empty history trailer; CJ + Carrier reject unknown
versions (tripwire for the strict-version stores).
- README §6: replaces the rosy "newer versions ignore unknown
trailers" claim with what's actually implemented — multi-version
reads on PJ + Substrate, strict equality elsewhere — and points
at the test as the contract anchor.
When the strict-version stores grow their own v2, the rejection
tests will need to flip to acceptance; the layout is right there in
the test so the edit is mechanical.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
INTEGRATION.md §3 used to show a sensor-poll thread calling
model->svids.set_value() directly while the io_context thread reads
the same SVID for an inbound S1F3. That's a data race — there are
zero locks anywhere in EquipmentDataModel and there's no intention
to add them. The library is single-threaded by design; the doc was
just inviting trouble.
This commit makes the actual contract explicit:
- INTEGRATION.md §3: thread-safety callout box. All access must run
on the io_context that drives the HSMS connection. Sensor updates
from other threads marshal via asio::post(io.get_executor(), ...).
Same applies to set_*_change_handler callbacks (they fire on the
io_context thread; observers must be thread-safe or hand work off).
- README.md §3 (Monitoring & observability): added a paragraph noting
that hooks fire on the io_context thread, blocking I/O inside a
handler stalls the dispatcher, and metrics exporters must respect
the same contract.
- tests/test_thread_safety.cpp: two scenarios that exercise the
canonical pattern — N producer threads asio::post sensor updates
onto a worker-driven io_context; reads marshal back through the
io. Catches obvious regressions (e.g. someone adding a
"convenience" cross-thread mutator that bypasses the strand).
A passing run isn't proof of race-freedom under ThreadSanitizer —
it pins down the *pattern* customers should follow. TSan integration
is a separate workstream.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The E84StateMachine timers landed last commit but stayed theoretical —
arming was delivered via abstract callbacks the application had to
glue to a real clock. This commit ships the canonical glue:
- include/secsgem/gem/e84_asio_timers.hpp: header-only
E84AsioTimers wraps three asio::steady_timers, wires set_timer_handlers
on attach(), routes async_wait expiry back into fsm.on_timeout().
detach() cancels everything cleanly.
- tests/test_e84_asio_timers.cpp: four scenarios exercised through a
real asio::io_context with wall-clock timers — TA1 expiry,
signal-driven cancel before TA1 fires, TA3 expiry from the
Transferring state, and detach() halting further transitions.
These cover the integration the synthetic unit tests in
test_e84_timers.cpp can't reach.
- INTEGRATION.md §4.6: the vendor-side recipe — create the port,
set timeouts, make_shared<E84AsioTimers>(...)::attach(), feed signals
from your I/O bridge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
E84StateMachine had the full signal-level handshake but no timer
enforcement. In a real AMHS that's a deadlock: if equipment is slow to
assert L_REQ / U_REQ, or AMHS is slow to assert BUSY / COMPT, neither
side notices — the wires just sit stuck. SEMI E84 §6 mandates three
timers that bound each leg of the dance.
TA1 — armed in ValidAsserted, cancelled in Load/UnloadReady.
AMHS bounds how long equipment takes to acknowledge VALID.
TA2 — armed in Load/UnloadReady, cancelled in Transferring.
Equipment bounds how long AMHS takes to start the transfer.
TA3 — armed in Transferring, cancelled on Complete.
Equipment bounds the BUSY-phase duration.
The FSM stays I/O-free (it's the design invariant): arm/cancel are
delivered via callbacks, the application owns the asio::steady_timer,
and the application calls `fsm.on_timeout(id)` when its real clock
fires. Stale on_timeout calls (post-cancel race) are no-ops.
On expiry, the FSM transitions to a new `HandoffFault` state, records
the `E84Fault` reason, fires the optional fault_handler, and latches
the fault until `reset()`. Signal jitter on the wires cannot silently
clear a recorded handshake timeout — once you've crossed the timer,
you stop.
Defaults are all-zero, which disables arming. This is what every
existing test relies on, and what back-to-back simulation (no
wall-clock) needs. Production tools call `set_timeouts({2s, 2s, 60s})`
or whatever their port spec dictates.
12 new test cases / 59 assertions: arming per state, cancelling per
exit, expiry-to-fault for all three timers, ES cancels everything,
stale-expiry no-op, fault latching across signal jitter, and a
full-cycle arm/cancel trace.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The closest thing to an in-repo "RTS" — a runnable executable that
points at any HSMS-SS equipment and walks through every E30
fundamental + additional capability, reporting pass/fail per check
and exiting with the right code for CI / canary use.
build/secs_conformance --host <ip> --port 5000 --device 0
Each check sends a host-initiated primary and asserts the equipment
replies with the expected stream/function within T3. Checks chain
forward through async callbacks (each reply handler kicks off the
next check) so the conformance run stays inside one io.run().
Initial check set (mirrors COMPLIANCE.md §3 fundamentals):
E37 §7.2 SELECT handshake
E30 §6.5 S1F13/F14 Establish Comms
E30 §6.7 S1F1/F2 Are You There
E30 §6.13 S1F11/F12 SVID Namelist
E30 §6.16 S2F29/F30 ECID Namelist
E30 §6.20 S2F17/F18 Clock
E30 §6.14 S5F5/F6 List Alarms
E30 §6.17 S7F19/F20 PP List
E30 §6.10 S1F19/F20 GEM Compliance
Validated against the demo server: 9/9 PASS.
README.md §8 (Compliance + certification) updated to point at the
harness as the suggested first-line conformance check. Tool
vendors fork apps/secs_conformance.cpp and add their own
capability-specific checks alongside.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
implementation_plan.md was a Layer-0..6 roadmap from the project's
spec-as-data exploration phase; every layer it described is now
shipped (Layer 0 foundations through Layer 4 message catalog +
state machines). Removed.
README rewritten for the fab-deployment audience. Sections added:
1. Persistence directory layout (storage rules, disk budget, DR)
2. Security (network isolation, TLS tunnels, audit logging,
config signing)
3. Monitoring + observability (signals → hooks table, Prometheus
pattern)
4. High availability (active/standby on shared persistence)
5. Deployment patterns (Docker / systemd / k8s)
6. Upgrade path (YAML reload, code rollout, schema versioning)
7. Integration with the fab stack (MES / AMHS / OHT / recipe
engine table)
8. Compliance + certification (fork COMPLIANCE.md per tool, run
RTS)
9. Testing in production (canary, synthetic transactions, shadow
traffic)
10. Operational runbook (incident → first check → mitigation)
Stale stats refreshed: test count went 148/794 → 384/2390;
catalog grew to 164 messages; HSMS-GS, SECS-I T3/T4, per-port E84,
E42 formatted PPs all mentioned.
COMPLIANCE.md §9 lost its stale `implementation_plan.md` reference.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
E42 was an explicit out-of-scope item in the prior COMPLIANCE.md.
This commit closes it.
Wire messages added via the catalog:
S7F23 Formatted PP Send (H↔E, W=1)
S7F24 Formatted PP Ack (ProcessProgramAck)
S7F25 Formatted PP Request (PPID, W=1)
S7F26 Formatted PP Data (E→H, no reply)
Body shape: <L,4 PPID MDLN SOFTREV <L,n <L,2 CCODE <L,m <L,2
PNAME PVAL>>>>>. PVAL is declared ITEM so any SECS-II Item type
round-trips — proven by a test that mixes ASCII, BOOLEAN, U4, F8,
Binary, and nested List values in one step.
RecipeStore extension:
add_formatted(ppid, FormattedRecipe{mdln, softrev, steps})
get_formatted(ppid) -> optional<FormattedRecipe>
has_formatted(ppid) -> bool
Formatted + opaque views live alongside each other: a PPID can carry
both, size() counts unique PPIDs. remove() kills both views.
Six new tests cover wire round-trip per function, every
ProcessProgramAck code, ITEM passthrough, and the store's dual-view
semantics.
COMPLIANCE.md updated: E30 §6.17 row mentions S7F23-F26, S5 message
table grows two rows, §8 "out of scope" entry for E42 removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The SECS-I Protocol FSM now enforces T3 (reply timeout) and T4
(inter-block timeout) directly, instead of leaving them as
upper-layer hooks.
T3: on complete_send, if the block we just acked had W=1, record its
system_bytes in awaiting_reply_sys_ and emit ActionStartTimer{T3}.
deliver_recv cancels T3 when a block arrives whose system_bytes
match the outstanding request. EventTimeout{T3} aborts the FSM with
"T3 reply timeout".
T4: deliver_recv emits ActionStartTimer{T4} whenever the delivered
block has end_block=false. The next block's deliver_recv cancels
the timer; EventTimeout{T4} aborts with "T4 inter-block timeout".
abort() now also cancels T3/T4 and clears the tracking state.
Test changes:
- Old "T3/T4 are FSM-level no-ops" test → REPLACED by four new
tests: T3 arm+expire, T3 arm+matching-reply cancels, T4
arm+expire, T4 arm+next-block cancels.
- Two new observer accessors on Protocol (awaiting_reply,
awaiting_next_block) so the tests can assert tracking state
without poking internals.
COMPLIANCE.md §1a: T3 + T4 rows go ⬜ → ✅.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
E84 (Parallel I/O) is fundamentally per-load-port: each port has its
own ten-wire handshake with the AMHS. Earlier revisions modeled it
as a single equipment-wide FSM; this commit refactors to a per-port
store, so multi-LP tools can run independent handshakes in parallel.
Public API change in EquipmentDataModel:
E84StateMachine e84; -> removed
E84PortStore e84_ports; // create(port_id), get(port_id), ...
Convenience pass-throughs: E84PortStore::on_signal_change auto-creates
the port on first use (ergonomic for demos); applications should call
create() explicitly with their full port set.
The two existing callsites (test_gem300_scenario, test_e87_wire_scenarios)
are updated. The multi-LP test now demonstrates the actual win:
interleaved LP1 load + LP2 unload handshakes that reach their
respective Ready states without sequencing, and an ES on LP1 that
does NOT affect LP2 — exactly the failure mode the previous design
couldn't catch.
Five new dedicated tests in test_e84_ports.cpp for the store itself.
COMPLIANCE.md §4i updated: row now reflects per-port design.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the last terminal-services message: a multi-line broadcast push
to all terminals, no reply. Same TID+lines body as S10F5, W=0.
Generated via the catalog: data/messages.yaml schema entry +
auto-generated s10f7_terminal_display_broadcast / parse_s10f7.
Test round-trips TID and a 3-line broadcast through the builder
and parser, confirms W=0.
COMPLIANCE.md updated: S10F7 row in §5 added; §8 "out of scope"
entry removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Connection now supports both HSMS-SS (single session — the
constructor's behaviour, unchanged) and HSMS-GS (multi-session).
add_session(device_id) registers additional sessions; each one has
its own NotSelected/Selected state and its own message/selected
handlers. In GS mode the Select.req carries session_id=device_id;
in SS mode it stays at 0xFFFF (legacy). Linktest/Separate remain
connection-scope per spec.
Public API additions:
add_session(device_id)
set_session_message_handler(device_id, h)
set_session_selected_handler(device_id, h)
session_state(device_id) -> State
is_session_selected(device_id) -> bool
send_request(device_id, msg, cb)
send_data(device_id, msg)
Internal refactor: state_/on_message_/on_selected_ folded into a
SessionSlot map keyed by device_id; SS-style getters/setters route
through the primary session. T7 + linktest are connection-scope —
T7 fires only when no session is selected; linktest runs while at
least one is.
Five wire-level tests:
- passive: two sessions selected independently via Select.req
with their own session_id
- GS Select.req for an unregistered session id is Rejected
(EntityNotSelected)
- data routed by session_id; data on a not-selected session is
Rejected
- active: two registered sessions both end up selected via
serialized Select.req per session
- SS legacy: existing single-session API still works (session_id
0xFFFF in Select.req)
COMPLIANCE.md §1 updated: HSMS-GS row goes ⬜ → ✅.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-substrate transition history now survives restart. Each entry's
steady_clock timestamp is written as a system_clock-millis snapshot;
on replay the steady_clock time_point is reconstructed relative to
the current (steady_now, system_now) pair, so inter-event spacing
is preserved across restarts even if the FSM is in a different
process. Absolute wall-clock accuracy degrades by any NTP step
that happened between write and read; that's a documented caveat.
Record format goes v1 → v2. v1 (history-less) records still load,
just with empty history.
Test updates:
- the old "history is NOT journaled" test is REPLACED with one
that asserts every axis + event + label round-trips.
- hand-crafted v1 record on disk still loads (proves backwards
compat).
- 15 ms-spaced events restore with their spacing intact (±slop
for scheduler jitter).
Closes the "substrate history persistence" caveat from the post-#1-13
status writeup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the v1 caveat: the optional E40-0705 trailers on S16F11 —
recipe variables (RcpVar) and process parameters (ProcessParam),
each carrying a secs2::Item value of arbitrary type — now survive
restart.
Record format bumps to v2:
v2 header = v1 header
+ [u16 rcpvar_count][repeat: u16 name_len, name, u32 enc_len,
secs2::encode(value)]
+ [u16 ppparam_count][...same shape]
v1 records are still accepted by load_record_ (no extras come back).
Two new tests:
- round-trip mixed F4 / ASCII / U4 / nested-list values through
rcpvars + prprocessparams
- hand-crafted v1 record on disk still loads cleanly, just with
empty extras (proves backwards compat)
Closes the "PJ rcpvars / prprocessparams persistence" caveat from
the post-#1-13 status writeup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
End-to-end guide for an equipment vendor integrating the library
into a real semiconductor tool:
1. Architecture: what the runtime provides vs what the application
contributes — three boundary classes (EquipmentDataModel,
Router, hsms::Connection).
2. 30-minute first connection: YAML + minimal main() + run.
3. Wiring real sensors to SVIDs.
4. Plugging the FSMs into the tool: EPT, carriers, substrates,
E40 PJ / E94 CJ, alarms, recoverable exceptions.
5. Persistence: enable_persistence(dir) per store, storage budget,
replay semantics, current caveats.
6. Monitoring + observability: connection lifecycle hooks,
state-change handlers, S9 protocol errors.
7. Recommended deployment layout (/opt/acme-secsgem/...).
8. Integration testing checklist.
9. When to extend the runtime.
10. The honest gap between "this stack runs" and "this is a
certified GEM tool".
Cross-referenced from COMPLIANCE.md §9 distinction (stack vs tool).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Real GEM sessions don't serialize requests — the host can have many
primaries outstanding, replies may arrive in any order, and both
peers can talk at once. Connection demuxes via system_bytes per
E37 §8.3; this commit pins the behaviour with four wire tests:
- 5 in-flight requests; equipment buffers all primaries before
replying — proves Connection holds the pending map correctly
even when no replies are coming.
- 7 pipelined primaries with synchronous in-handler replies;
every host callback fires with the correct function and stream.
- Bidirectional in-flight: host issues 3 primaries while equipment
issues 3 of its own; all 6 callbacks resolve with the right
replies.
- 100-burst sequential cycle; confirms the pending_requests_ map
doesn't leak entries (every reply delivered ⇒ map drained).
Closes#13 in the test-gap backlog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SEMI E5 allows identifier fields (DATAID, RPTID, VID, CEID, ALID,
EXID, OBJID, …) to be encoded as U1, U2, U4, or U8. Our parsers
route through any_unsigned_first<T> in messages_helpers.hpp. The
existing per-message round-trip tests prove the U4 path; this
commit adds the cross-width matrix that the interop incident with
secsgem-py demanded:
- as_u4_scalar accepts U1/U2/U4/U8 inputs for the same value
- as_u8_scalar accepts every narrower width
- as_u1_scalar accepts wider widths when the value fits
- as_u1_scalar / as_u2_scalar REJECT out-of-range values rather
than silently truncating
- codec round-trip preserves the format byte AND the value
- signed counterparts (as_i4_scalar) follow the same rule for I1/I2
If a future code-gen change hard-codes a single width on any
identifier field, the rejection case here breaks loudly.
Closes#12 in the test-gap backlog (renumbered: this is gap entry
"identifier wildcard matrix").
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four new test cases:
* S3F19 verify with matching map → SlotMapVerifyAck::Accept and
CSMS lands in Read on the equipment side.
* S3F19 verify with disagreeing map → Mismatch ack and CSMS lands
in Mismatched.
* 4 LPs + 4 carriers, host verifies CAR-1 (mismatch) and CAR-3
(match) — only those two carriers move on the CSMS axis;
CAR-2/CAR-4 stay NotRead. Confirms per-carrier independence.
* Multi-LP E84 handshake sequencing (load then unload) round-trips
through Idle. Documents that the current E84StateMachine is
per-equipment, not per-port — a future per-port FSM would
update this test alongside.
Closes#11 in the test-gap backlog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_gem300_scenario.cpp drives EquipmentDataModel in-memory. This
companion test does the same lifecycle through actual hsms::Connection
frames on a loopback socket pair:
S1F13/F14 establish comm
S3F17/F18 carrier action ProceedWithCarrier (E87)
S16F11/F12 process job create (E40)
S14F9/F10 control job create (E94)
S16F27/F28 CJSTART → CJ → Executing
S6F11 ControlJobExecuting CEID auto-emitted on transition
CJ → Completed via internal AllJobsComplete
EquipmentEmulator owns the data model + a passive Connection,
registers state-change handlers that synthesize S6F11/S16F9 on
transitions, and dispatches the inbound primaries above. HostEmulator
wraps the active Connection and captures everything the equipment
sends unsolicited.
This is the wire-level equivalent of the existing in-memory scenario,
which closes the gap between "FSM works" and "full GEM 300 stack
works on a wire".
Closes#10 in the test-gap backlog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
FSM unit tests already verified state transitions fire the change
handler — but they don't prove the frame leaves the socket with the
right CEID and linked report payload. This commit wires a passive
equipment Connection to an EquipmentDataModel via a small emitter,
drives transitions, and asserts on what the host peer receives.
Six new tests:
EPT → Productive ⇒ S6F11(kCeidProductive) with the linked report
EPT (no subscription) ⇒ no S6F11 (proves disable gate)
PJ Queued→SettingUp ⇒ S16F9 PRJobAlert with PRJOBID + state byte
PJ alert_enabled=false ⇒ no S16F9 (per-PJ gate works)
CJ → Executing ⇒ S6F11(ControlJobExecuting) on the wire
Substrate StartProcessing ⇒ S6F11(SubstrateInProcess) on the wire
All use the generated parse_s6f11 / parse_s16f9 to decode the
incoming frame and assert against typed fields (CEID, PRJOBID, etc.)
rather than poking variant internals — that ties the test to the
schema-as-data rather than to wire byte offsets.
Closes#9 in the test-gap backlog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deterministic-seed fuzz coverage of the byte-decoding surface:
- secs2::decode on 2000 random buffers
- secs2::decode on every truncation of a real encoding + 500
one-byte flips of the full encoding
- hsms::Frame::decode on 1000 random payloads
- hsms::Header::decode on 2000 random 10-byte buffers
- secsi::Block::decode on 2000 random buffers
- secs2 encode/decode round-trip identity across a battery of every
Item factory (List, ASCII, Binary, Boolean, U1..U8, I1..I8, F4/F8,
nested List)
- oversize <A 3 length-bytes> length-prefix doesn't allocate GBs
- 64-level nested List round-trip doesn't blow the stack
Contract is binary: no crash, no UB. Each decoder is allowed to throw
or return whatever; we deliberately don't assert *what* result comes
back, only that control returns. Fixed PRNG seeds make any failure
reproducible from the CI log alone.
Closes#8 in the test-gap backlog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
test_secsi.cpp covered T2 on the send side (retry) and a tick-based
back-to-back exchange. This commit fills in the rest of the timer
matrix at FSM level:
T1 in RecvBlock → abort, reason mentions "T1"
T1 outside RecvBlock → ignored
T2 in RecvEotSent → abort
T2 in RecvBlock → abort (mid-block stall)
T3 / T4 → FSM-level no-op (documented as upper-layer driven)
T2 contrast → send-side retries, recv-side aborts (same timer,
different recovery, both demonstrated in one test)
If a future commit moves T3 or T4 enforcement into the FSM, the
no-op test breaks loudly so protocol.hpp can be updated alongside.
Closes#7 in the test-gap backlog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
S9F3/F5 are covered by test_s9_fallback (router path); S9F9/F11 by
test_hsms_timers (timer/over-length). This commit adds S9F7 wire-level
tests for the third path — a primary whose body fails secs2::decode.
Three new cases:
- hand-built primary with truncated <B> body provokes S9F7
carrying the original 10-byte MHEAD (sys + stream + function)
- emission is non-fatal: the next well-formed primary still routes
to the registered handler
- data-while-NOT-SELECTED still echoes Reject(EntityNotSelected)
(sanity copy of the test_hsms_connection case so the "what does
the equipment say when a peer sends garbage" family lives together)
Closes#6 in the test-gap backlog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Real-socket tests for the timer family in E37 §10 — these replace
the "the timer fires somewhere" implicit assumption with
end-to-end observations on a loopback pair:
T3: send_request that gets no reply emits S9F9 with the original
MHEAD echoed in the body and surfaces Timeout to the caller.
T6: active mode whose Select.req goes unanswered self-closes
with a "T6 timeout on Select" reason.
T7: passive mode that never receives Select.req self-closes
with a "T7 not-selected timeout" reason.
T8: peer sends only the 4-byte length prefix; T8 expires mid-read
and closes with "T8 intercharacter timeout".
Plus S9F11 emission for an over-length frame (length prefix of
1 GiB+1) — body's <B 10> echoes the offending bytes verbatim.
Per-test timer profiles (only the timer under test is short, the
rest are 5s) so the FSM isn't racing against unrelated timers.
Closes#5 in the test-gap backlog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-EXID binary record (.ex), magic + version + atomic .tmp+rename.
Records full E5 §9 lifecycle: state, EXID, EXTYPE, EXMESSAGE, and
the candidate EXRECVRA list.
Cleared exceptions are terminal — the FSM transitions through
Cleared remove the in-memory entry AND delete the journal file
(matching the existing in-memory semantics). Recovering /
RecoverFailed states survive restart: the application can decide
on replay whether to retry recovery or abort.
Five new tests cover post+replay, Recovering-survives-restart,
autonomous-clear cleanup, RecoverFailed retry post-restart, and
corrupt-record drop.
This completes #12 in the test-gap backlog (persistence for the four
in-memory stores beyond Spool).
Closes#4 in the test-gap backlog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-job binary record (.pj / .cj) with magic+version, atomic
.tmp+rename. PJ store additionally writes an order.idx index file
that preserves HOQ-aware queue position across restarts.
Rcpvars / prprocessparams (secs2::Item variants) are intentionally
out of scope for v1 — they're optional E40 trailers and need a body
codec round-trip; callers re-populate via set_e40_extras() after
restart.
Five new tests cover full lifecycle replay (Processing mid-run +
HOQ-reordered queue), dequeue-deletes-file, corrupt-record drop,
CJ state + PJ-list replay, and CJ remove cleanup.
Closes#3 in the test-gap backlog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Same pattern as carriers: per-substrate binary record (.sub) with
atomic .tmp+rename, replay on enable, delete on remove. Records
current state across all three E90 axes (location / processing /
ID-status), plus substid / carrierid / slot / free-form location
label. History is deliberately NOT journaled — it's an in-memory
ring buffer and rebuilding from replayed state would mislead.
Five new tests cover full-axis replay, every terminal processing
state, remove-deletes-journal, corrupt-record drop, and the
history-is-transient invariant.
Closes#2 in the test-gap backlog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mirrors SpoolStore: per-record file with atomic .tmp+rename, magic+
version-prefixed binary layout, replay on enable, delete on remove.
FSMs gain a restore_state() that bypasses the transition table and
handlers since a replay isn't a transition.
Six new tests cover write+restart+replay across every CIDS/CSMS/CAS
axis, remove-deletes-journal, malformed-record drop-not-poison, and
the persistence-disabled no-op path.
Closes#1 in the test-gap backlog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A host couldn't drive the new messages through the HostHandler class —
only the server side knew how to dispatch them. Adds six new senders
plus a unit test that walks each through a real loopback connection:
* send_legacy_remote_command -> S2F21
* send_event_report_request -> S6F15
* send_individual_report_request -> S6F19
* send_annotated_report_request -> S6F21
* send_pp_load_inquire -> S7F1
* send_delete_pp -> S7F17
Suite: 296 cases / 1571 assertions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds round-trip checks for the SECS-II messages added in the AA
catalog-growth commit but never cross-validated against secsgem-py:
* S2F21/F22 — legacy remote command (no params). secsgem-py's
stock S2F21 sends with W=0; we register a W=1 override so the
transaction awaits our S2F22 reply. Also widens CMDA's allowed
types to include Binary (secsgem-py 0.3.0 declares CMDA as
Dynamic[U1, I1] only; SEMI E5 §10.18 says Binary, and our server
emits it that way).
* S6F15/F16 — event-report request by CEID.
* S6F19/F20 — individual report request by RPTID.
* S6F21/F22 — annotated individual report request.
* S7F1/F2 — PP load inquire.
* S7F17/F18 — PP delete.
Suite is now 32 named host-vs-server checks — all green in three
consecutive runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a docker-compose service `server-spool` that runs secs_server
with --spool-dir pointed at a named volume. Two-phase Python
harness (interop/spool_persistence_test.py):
1. Enqueue phase: force-spool one S6F11(CEID=300) via the
SPOOL_ON / START / SPOOL_OFF RCMD trio, then disconnect.
2. Driver runs `docker compose restart server-spool` between
the phases — the named volume preserves the journal files.
3. Drain phase: reconnect, send S6F23(Transmit), verify the
replayed S6F11 carries CEID 300.
Surfaces a real interop bug along the way: secsgem-py 0.3.0 encodes
RSDC (and other "single-byte status" fields) as <U1>, while SEMI E5
spells them as <B>. Our `as_binary_first` was strict on Binary; now
accepts either (the byte semantics are identical, and the leniency is
symmetric with the U-type widening from the first interop commit).
Result: enqueue → docker restart → drain returns CEID 300 cleanly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the test gap for messages I added but whose reply parsers were
only generated, never exercised:
* S6F8 — full nested DATAID/CEID/DS/DV structure.
* S12F14 — row-format map reply (RSINF tuples).
* S12F16 — array-format map reply.
* S12F18 — coordinate-format map reply.
Suite: 295 cases / 1545 assertions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cross-validates the GEM 300 streams secsgem-py 0.3.0 doesn't ship
(S3 carriers, S14 control jobs, S16 process jobs) by minting custom
`SecsStreamFunction` subclasses on the fly and registering the
matching `DataItem` definitions (CARRIERID, CTLJOBID, PRJOBID, PRCMD,
CTLJOBCMD, MF, …) with `secsgem.secs.data_items`.
Drives the C++ passive server through:
* S3F17/F18 (E87 carrier action) — server replies CarrierIDUnknown
for the unregistered carrier.
* S16F5/F6 (E40 PRJobCommand) — server returns InvalidObject
for the nonexistent PJ.
* S16F27/F28 (E94 CJobCommand) — server cascades CJSTART.
Scope cut: S16F11 full-body and S14F9 (both have variable-length
nested lists with named scalar elements) hit a quirk of secsgem-py's
SFDL tokenizer where `< L name > <SCALAR> >` parses as a fixed-1
list, not a variable-length list of SCALARs. The full-body S16F11
is already round-tripped by the C++ unit tests (and via secsgem-py's
host driver in `host_vs_cpp_server.py`), so the raw harness focuses
on the no-variable-list messages where the SFDL grammar cooperates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The doc was last updated when only E40 + E94 were in tree. Brings it
up to date with everything actually implemented:
* New §4a–§4k tables for each GEM 300 standard: E40, E94, E87, E90,
E116, E120, E148, E157, E84, E5 §13 wafer maps, and the exception
recovery extension (S5F13–F18 + ExceptionStateMachine).
* Refreshed message coverage matrix to all 149 catalog entries
(added S1F23/F24, S2F21/F22, S6F5–F8/F15–F22, S7F1/F2/F17/F18,
S10F3/F4, S12F9–F18).
* Updated test count to 291 cases / 1515 assertions.
* New §7 documents the secsgem-py interop harness (24 host-side
checks + raw-GEM300 round-trip).
* §8 trimmed: persistent spool is no longer "out of scope" (CC1
landed); E40/E87/E90 removed from "Layer 5 follow-on" list since
they're done.
* §9 honesty pass — every GEM 300 standard in scope now implemented
end-to-end; the remaining gap is third-party RTS certification +
per-vendor application wiring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
raphael